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Abstract 
 
Heterosexual people with more positive attitudes to lesbians and gay men generally 
believe that homosexuality is immutable, is not a discrete social category, and that 
homosexuality exists in all cultures and time periods.  Equivalent beliefs about 
heterosexuality and beliefs about components of sexuality have been less-often 
researched. 136 people with diverse sexualities described heterosexuality as more 
universal across history and culture than homosexuality (Study 1).  69 heterosexual-
identified participants similarly believed that love, identity, behaviour and desire were 
more historically invariant aspects of heterosexuality than of homosexuality (Study 2).  
Less prejudiced participants thought all components of homosexuality – except for 
identity – were more historically invariant. Teasing apart beliefs about the history of 
components of heterosexuality and homosexuality suggests that there is no “essential” 
relationship between sexual prejudice and the tension between ‘essentialist’ and 
‘constructivist’ views about the history of sexual identity.  
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Why is the History of Heterosexuality Essential?  Beliefs about the History of 
Sexuality and Their Relationship to Sexual Prejudice  
 
 It is almost a truism of social psychology that high status identities are taken 
as the basis for social norms, and that those norms are then considered to apply to 
everyone. Such conflations reinforce inequality when they allow dominant group 
identities to use themselves as a standard for judging others (Mummendey & Wenzel, 
1999) or to recruit lower status group members’ agency into serving the higher status 
group’s agenda (Simon & Oakes, 2006).  Many traditions of critical thought share the 
Hegelian assumption that dominance requires the illusion that the subordinate “other” 
is dispensable to the dominant group, even while the dominant group critically rely on 
the “other” for its ways of being.  The analysis is common to such domains as class 
(Marx & Engels, 1978), gender (de Beauvoir, 1949/2011), colonization (Said, 1978), 
and, of course, sexuality (Warner, 1993).   
 Psychologists have also taken note of the tendency to conflate heterosexuality 
with universal categories such as society, nature, culture, and history.  Herek (2007) 
distinguished sexual stigma at two levels of analysis; heterosexist ideology and sexual 
prejudice, describing the heterosexual ideology embedded in cultural practices as one 
that presumes and prescribes heterosexuality as a way of being for everyone.  Other 
researchers have called this ideology heteronormativity (e.g., Hegarty, Pratto, & 
Lemieux, 2004; Warner, 1993).  Heterosexist ideology is distinct from sexual 
prejudice, which Herek (2007) describes as the overt behavioural manifestation of 
sexual stigma.  The effects of sexual stigma on the well-being of sexual minority 
people such as gay, lesbian and bisexual people are multiple and well documented 
(Meyer, 2003) 
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In recent decades, research psychologists have been advised to resist 
heterosexism by writing in an even-handed way about homosexuality and 
heterosexuality (Herek, Kimmel, Amaro, & Melton, 1991).  People typically explain 
differences between sexual identity groups by linguistically positioning 
heterosexuality as the norm for comparison, rendering the psychology of sexual 
minority groups as ‘the effect to be explained’ (Hegarty & Pratto, 2004).  Even 
scientists who express a desire to explain group differences in even-handed ways can 
end up focusing their explanations on sexual minority people (Hegarty & Pratto, 
2001).   Such asymmetric explanations have consequences for stereotyping.  When 
one group is linguistically positioned as the norm and another as “the effect to be 
explained,” readers draw the conclusion that the former group is the one with greater 
power and agency (Bruckmüller & Abele, 2010; Bruckmüller, Hegarty, & Abele, 
2012).  As such, the advice to focus explanatory attention on heterosexuality appears 
to be sound, but difficult to follow in practice.   
Informed by such analyses of heterosexist ideology, and the evidence their 
effects on scientific thinking about group differences the present article aims to 
examine essentialist beliefs about sexuality from a fresh angle.  To be specific, 
research on essentialist beliefs about sexuality have often implicitly or explicitly 
focused on beliefs about homosexuality, such that beliefs about heterosexuality have 
remained unexamined.  Moreover, beliefs about components of sexuality – love, 
identity, behaviour and desire – have not been empirically investigated.  The two 
studies in this paper demonstrate the importance of addressing both issues.  Before 
describing the studies, we review the development of psychologists’ interest in and 
understanding of essentialist beliefs about sexuality and detail how our work 
constitutes a fresh take on this area of growing interest.  
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Essentialist Beliefs About Sexuality 
Essentialism is the belief that complex phenomena, such as social identities, 
are caused by unseen causes, such as genes, and that the actions of these agents can 
explain the particular characteristics of these phenomena (Medin, 1989).  Research on 
essentialist beliefs about homosexuality has progressed in three waves.  The 
attributional theory of stigma predicted that people would respond more harshly to a 
stigmatized target whose behaviour was perceived to be under personal control 
(Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, 1989).  This theory inspired Whitley’s (1990) research 
which showed that heterosexuals who consider sexual orientation a matter of personal 
choice espoused more negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men.  However, the 
argument that beliefs about personal choice were a cause of tolerant attitudes towards 
lesbians and gay men never gained support.  Experiments which tested the effects of 
manipulating beliefs about sexual orientation on attitudes towards lesbians and gay 
men produced very mixed findings and frequent null results (see Hegarty, 2010; 
Hegarty & Golden, 2008 for discussion).  Close analysis of historical shifts in public 
opinion in the United States also fail to support the idea that heterosexual Americans 
became more gay-friendly in recent years as a consequence of an a shift in their 
beliefs about the immutability of sexuality (Lewis, 2009). 
A second wave of research was inspired by increased interest in essentialism 
in the interdisciplinary study of sexuality (DeCecco & Elia, 1993, DeCecco & Parker, 
1995; Stein, 1990).  Researchers tended to assume that beliefs about the ‘essence’ of 
group identity tended to be ideologically influenced and served the purpose of 
rationalizing inequality (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 
1997).  However, sexuality appeared to some psychologists to be an exception to this 
rule, because heterosexual people who thought sexual orientation was genetically 
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determined expressed more positive attitudes toward lesbians and gay men (e.g., Bem, 
1998).  This tension was first addressed by Hegarty and Pratto (2001; Hegarty, 2002) 
who showed that beliefs in the ‘immutability’ of sexual orientation were negatively 
correlated with the belief that lesbians and gay men were ‘fundamentally’ different 
from heterosexuals. Furthermore, immutability beliefs were correlated with positive 
attitudes toward lesbians and gay men, and fundamentality beliefs were correlated 
were negative attitudes.   
Similarly Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst (2000) described beliefs about social 
groups as varying about the extent to which those group were perceived as natural, 
and as discrete, bounded entities. These dimensions of ‘naturalness’ and ‘entiativity’ 
were found to be influenced by the status of the groups in question. Whilst two groups 
may be considered just as natural as each other, lower status groups were viewed as 
more homogeneous and more of an entity than higher status groups. Haslam, 
Rothschild and Ernst (2002) later observed that gay men were believed to be a more 
‘entitative’ and less ‘natural’ group than two other lower status groups; women and 
Black people.  In this later study, essentialist beliefs were correlated with sexual 
prejudice, but not with either sexism or racism.   
Whilst the research of Hegarty, Haslam and their colleagues suggested that 
belief in the discreteness of sexual identity categories is related to prejudice, Falomir 
and Mugny (2009) reasoned that some heterosexual men might find gay men easier to 
tolerate if they were reassured of a categorical boundary between these two groups.  
In support of this idea, they found that only heterosexual men who were threatened by 
homosexuality reported reduced prejudice toward gay men when presented with a 
biological argument about sexuality.  In total this wave of research suggested that 
essentialist beliefs have no “essential” relationship to prejudice, and that essentialist 
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beliefs could also be consequences of individual and group-based motives (see also 
Verkuyten, 2003; Yzerbyt et al., 1997).   
A third wave of research was initiated by Haslam and Levy (2006), who 
conducted larger, more psychometrically sound studies of essentialist beliefs and 
prejudice than other researchers had done.  Building on past research findings (e.g., 
Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Whitley, 1990), Haslam and Levy (2006) isolated a belief in 
the immutability of sexuality, associated with lower sexual prejudice, and a belief in 
the discreteness of sexual orientation, associated with higher sexual prejudice.  These 
authors also isolated a third dimension of belief in the ‘universality’ of sexual 
orientation across culture and historical time. They found that belief in the 
universality of homosexuality was positively correlated with immutability beliefs and 
negatively correlated with discreteness beliefs and sexual prejudice.  This three-factor 
structure was robust across beliefs about the sexualities of women and the sexualities 
of men.  
Simultaneously new theories of the development sexual orientation became 
better informed by feminist critiques of research on sexuality, and described men’s 
sexualities as more impervious to sociocultural and situational influence than 
women’s sexualities (Baumeister, 2000; Diamond, 2003; Hammack, 2005).  These 
theories made sense of both existing findings that sexual minority men were less 
likely than sexual minority women to describe their identities as partially chosen (e.g., 
Golden, 1993; Savin-Williams, 1990), and newer research showing that women’s use 
of sexual identity labels often followed from their choice of female and male partners 
(Diamond, 2008).  These theories assumed that biological essentialist models of 
sexuality, such as genetic theories, fit men better than women. They further suggested 
that beliefs about male and female sexuality might differ from each other.   
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Recent research in social psychology has tended to employ Haslam and 
Levy’s (2006) framework.  For example, Morton and Postmes (2009) studied the 
relationship between these three dimensions of essentialist belief and in-group 
identification among lesbians, gay men, and bisexual participants. Highly-identified 
participants endorsed beliefs in the universality of homosexuality the most, beliefs in 
discreteness did not co-vary with in-group identification, and beliefs in immutability 
co-varied with identification in situation-specific ways.  Hegarty (2010) also used 
Haslam and Levy’s three-factor theory in a study of changes in attitudes and beliefs 
among students completing a university seminar on LGBT psychology; prejudice 
reduction was correlated only with a reduction in discreteness beliefs.     
The Present Study 
In spite of its increasing complexity, the literature on sexual prejudice and 
essentialism had two conceptual limits.  First, researchers have tended to assume that 
essentialist beliefs about homosexuality are of great interest to the neglect of beliefs 
about heterosexuality.  Second, researchers have not interrogated essentialist beliefs 
about different components of sexuality, and the emergence of multifactorial models 
required to explain women’s sexuality further prompt the need for such understanding.  
In Study 1 we tested whether beliefs about heterosexuality and homosexuality were 
equivalently strong, and in Study 2 we tested whether the relationships between 
sexual prejudice and  essentialist beliefs about components of homosexuality and 
heterosexuality; love, behaviour, identity and desire were equivalent.  By assessing 
relationships between essentialist beliefs about both homosexuality and 
heterosexuality and sexual prejudice, we aimed to both undo the effects of 
heterosexist ideology on this literature, and to investigate whether essentialist beliefs 
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reflected not only on ‘sexual prejudice’ but also on ‘heterosexist ideology’ (Herek, 
2007).    
 
Study 1: Essentialist Beliefs about Homosexuality and Heterosexuality 
 
Study 1 explored whether heterosexual and sexual minority people’s 
essentialist beliefs about  homosexuality and heterosexuality were the same or 
different.  As beliefs about heterosexuality had not been examined previously in the 
literature, our hypothesis about the extent to which beliefs about homosexuality and 
heterosexuality would be similar or different were by necessity exploratory.  
Method 
Participants. Seventy three men and 63 women participated as volunteers (age 
range = 17 to 66 years, M = 26.91). Those who identified their sexualities as 
heterosexual or ‘straight’ (n= 106) were categorized as sexual majority participants.   
Those who identified as bisexual (n=11), homosexual, gay or lesbian (n= 8), and other 
(n= 11) were categorized as sexual minority participants for statistical purposes. 
Fourteen other participants who did not identify their sexuality, and one who failed to 
complete the essentialist belief measure were excluded from the analysis.  
Materials.  The materials consisted of the Essentialist Belief Scale used in 
Haslam and Levy’s (2006) third study, presented as a series of 6-point Likert items.   
This 15-item scale includes 5 items that each measure three dimensions of essentialist 
belief: discreteness, immutability, and universality.  Four versions of the 
questionnaire were constructed to operationalize a 2x2 experimental design.  Two 
versions of the questionnaire asked about women’s sexuality and two versions asked 
about men’s sexuality.  Within these conditions, one version of the questionnaire 
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focused on homosexuality and the other focused on heterosexuality (see Appendix).   
A demographic sheet followed the essentialist belief scale.   
Procedure.  Most participants were approached at public venues on campus 
and completed a paper copy of the questionnaire anonymously.  Others were recruited 
via a snowball sampling method from the first researcher’s personal contacts on social 
networking sites, and completed electronic questionnaires, which were returned them 
via email or posted to the researchers.  Participants were randomly assigned to 
condition and all were debriefed as to the purpose of the study upon completing the 
materials.     
Results 
 We calculated essentialism scores for each of the three sub-scales by 
averaging across the five items of each subscale.  The discreteness variable had low 
reliability (α = 0.59), and inspection of the correlation matrix showed that Item 2 was 
not robustly correlated with the other items. Excluding this item raised Cronbach’s α 
to .65 for this measure, and below we report analysis for the scale with this item 
removed.   The measures of immutability, and universality had moderate reliability (α 
= .73, .63 respectively).  While somewhat low, these reliability statistics are 
comparable with other studies which have used similar measures (e.g., Morton & 
Postmes, 2009).  Absolute values of kurtosis and skew were less than 1 for all three 
variables indicating their normal distribution.   
 We next examined whether essentialist beliefs about homosexuality and 
heterosexuality were equally strong or were different by conducting three 2 x 2 x 2 x 
2 ANOVAs.  These ANOVAS had four between-subjects variables; target sexuality 
(heterosexual vs. homosexual), target gender (women vs. men), participant sexual 
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identity (majority vs. minority), and participant gender (women vs. men).  Each of the 
three essentialist beliefs served as a dependent variable in each of the analyses.   
We examined belief in discreteness first. None of these independent variables 
or their interactions had significant effects on discreteness beliefs, all p >.10.   The 
analysis of immutability beliefs revealed two significant interactions.  First, target 
sexuality interacted with participant gender, F(1, 120) = 6.81, p =.01, ηp2 =.05. 
Second, this two-way interaction was moderated by a further three-way interaction 
involving target sexuality, participant gender, and participant sexuality, F(1, 120) = 
4.52, p =.04, ηp2 = .04.  2 x 2 ANOVAs conducted separately of sexual minority and 
sexual majority participants, revealed no significant effects among sexual majority 
participants, all F<1.7, all p >.20.  A significant interaction occurred between target 
group and participant gender among sexual minority participants, F(1, 26) = 5.79, p 
=.02, ηp
2 = .18.   Men believed heterosexuality to be somewhat more immutable than 
did women (Ms = 4.08, 3.42 respectively), while women believed in the immutability 
of homosexuality more than men did (4.12, 2.89 respectively).   Tukey’s post hoc test 
(α = .05) revealed that neither gender difference was statistically significant.   
The analysis of belief in the universality of sexual orientation demonstrated 
why beliefs about ‘sexuality’ and beliefs about ‘homosexuality’ are not always the 
same thing; participants perceived heterosexuality to be more universal than 
homosexuality (Ms = 4.66, 4.27 respectively), F(1, 120) = 6.28, p =.01, ηp2 = .05.  
Women also endorsed universality beliefs more than men did (Ms = 4.59, 4.36 
respectively), F(1, 120) = 4.23, p =.04, ηp2 = .03, and the interaction between these 
two main effects approached significance, F(1, 120) = 6.38, p =.07, ηp2 = .03.  
Women and men endorsed beliefs about heterosexuality to similar degrees (Ms = 4.68, 
4.63 respectively), but women endorsed universality beliefs about homosexuality 
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somewhat more than men did (Ms = 4.47, 4.07 respectively).  Tukey’s post hoc test (α 
= .05) revealed that neither gender difference was statistically significant.  No other 
main effects or interactions were significant. 
Lastly, we examined correlations between discreteness, immutability, and 
universality beliefs and participants’ age.  As in Haslam and Levy’s (2006) study, 
universality beliefs about homosexuality were negatively correlated with discreteness 
beliefs, r (70) = -.29, p = .01, and positively correlated with immutability beliefs, r 
(70) = .37, p  = .001.  However, we did not replicate this structure among participants 
who reported their beliefs about heterosexuality.  Belief in the universality and 
discreteness of heterosexuality, and belief in the universality and immutability of 
heterosexuality were not significantly correlated, r (78) = -.19, .09 respectively.  
Correlations between beliefs in discreteness and immutability were not significant 
with regard to either homosexuality or heterosexuality, r = -.11, +.19 respectively.  
Participant age was not significantly correlated with belief in immutability, 
discreteness or universality. 
  
Discussion.   
The most suggestive finding from our first exploratory study is that sexual 
minority and majority women and men reported greater belief in the universality of 
heterosexuality that in the universality of homosexuality.  Similar differences in 
essentialist beliefs about homosexuality and heterosexuality were not observed with 
regard to beliefs about discreteness. The interacting effects of participant sex and 
target sexuality on beliefs about immutability must be regarded with some caution.  
Our sample was small, and larger community samples report a very different effect 
such that sexual minority men report their sexualities as more immutable than do 
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sexual minority women (Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 2009).  In sum, universality beliefs 
emerged as the dimension where it appears most important to tease apart beliefs about 
‘sexuality’ in general, from beliefs about homosexuality and heterosexuality.  
Consequently, our second study examined beliefs about components of homosexuality 
and heterosexuality, and their relationship to sexual prejudice. 
 
 
Study 2: Beliefs About the History of Homosexuality and Heterosexuality 
 
In Study 1 people reported more belief in the universality of heterosexuality 
than in the universality of homosexuality.  This effect might pertain to concepts such 
as  heterosexist ideology (Herek, 2007) and heteronormativity (Warner, 1993) to 
varying extents.  Because heterosexuality is implicated in human reproduction, it 
seems obvious and non-ideological that heterosexuality is universal across culture and 
history.  As one participant in Study 1 wrote next to an item indicating agreement 
with the universality of heterosexuality, “of course, otherwise I wouldn’t be doing this 
quiz.”  On the other hand, there was no obvious ceiling effect in participants’ 
universality beliefs about heterosexuality, suggesting that this meaning is not the only 
one that people call to mind when they are asked to report their beliefs about 
heterosexuality.  Indeed, sexuality is a multidimensional construct that involves such 
components as romantic love, sexual identity, and sexual desire (Diamond, 2003; 
DeCecco, 1982), not all of which have a clear causal relationship to reproduction.  
Showing an awareness of the differences between these components, another 
participant in Study 1 wrote in the margin next to a universality items about female 
homosexuality; “Not quite sure whether you mean females of whom have 'come out' 
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(sic) or if you mean female tendencies towards homosexuality…”  Such comments 
suggest that some people sometimes call to mind different components of sexuality 
when reporting their essentialist beliefs.    
Study 2 had three goals.  First, we aimed to extend the finding that people 
believed more in the universality of heterosexuality than in the universality of 
homosexuality to a context in which people reported their beliefs about components 
of sexual identity.  Second, we aimed to assess the relationship between those 
essentialist beliefs and sexual prejudice. Because Study 2 focused on sexual prejudice, 
we reported analysis only for heterosexual participants. Finally, Study 2 brought the 
psychological study of essentialist beliefs and debates about the history of sexuality 
into closer dialogue.  In other domains, social psychologists have repeatedly found 
that beliefs about the history of intergroup relations can affect individuals’ reactions 
to contemporary inequalities (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; 
Hopkins & Reicher, 2001; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; Liu & Hilton, 2005; 
McGarty et al., 2005; Sibley, Liu, Duckitt, & Kahn, 2008; Zebel et al., 2007).  We 
discuss how our study engaged the ‘essentialism-constructionism’ debate among pro-
gay history scholars next. 
The ‘essentialism-constructionism’ debate was prompted by the recognition 
that homosexual behaviour had occurred throughout history (see Stein, 1990).   
Within this debate, ‘essentialists’ tended to argue that such behaviour implied that 
people with homosexual identities existed in pre-modern periods (e.g., Boswell, 1994), 
and “social constructionists” argued that homosexual identities only cohered in recent 
modern periods as sexuality became more central to Western concepts of personhood 
(Faderman, 1991; Foucault, 1978; Halperin, 2000).  Essentialism might appear to be a 
pro-gay strategy because the assertion that gay people have always existed seems to 
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legitimate the rights of gay people to exist in the present.  Indeed, belief in the 
universality of homosexuality is predictive of both lower sexual prejudice among 
heterosexuals (Haslam & Levy, 2006) and of higher identification with LGB identity 
among LGB people (Morton & Postmes, 2009).   However, from a social 
constructionist perspective, the projection of gay identity back in time appears to be a 
case of ‘hindsight bias’ that overlooks the variable relationship between the 
components of sexuality across historical time (Fischhoff, 1975).   
Real-world events in the United States of America also suggested the possibility of 
pro-gay constructivist beliefs debate on the rights which sexual minority citizens 
enjoy.  Sodomy laws in the United States were upheld by the Supreme Court in the 
1986 Bowers vs. Hardwick ruling which equated the old crime of ‘sodomy’ with 
modern homosexual identity, such that homosexuality could have no legitimate place 
in the nation’s traditions.  This judgment limited the equal protection of sexual 
minorities quite severely in the subsequent years (Halley, 1993, 1994).  Bowers was 
overturned in 2004 by the Lawrence vs. Texas judgment, in which the justices ruled 
that sodomy and sexual identity were different from each other, that sodomy laws 
targeted both homosexual and heterosexual acts, and that homosexual and 
heterosexual acts shared a similar right to privacy (see Herek, 2007; Tribe, 2004 for 
discussion).  Contra to available social psychological findings (Haslam & Levy, 2006; 
Morton & Postmes, 2009), this recent legal history in the United States suggests that 
an essentialist theory is ‘not essential’ to oppose heterosexist ideology, and that 
beliefs about the historical universality of identity might have less clear relationships 
to sexual prejudice than beliefs about other components of sexuality.   
In Study 2 we examined heterosexual participants’ sexual prejudice, and their 
beliefs about the universality of four components of sexuality across historical time; 
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love, identity, behaviour, and desire (Diamond, 2003; DeCecco, 1982).  Both the 
debate among historians, and the difference between the Supreme Court decisions on 
sodomy laws differ not on the matter of the historical universality of “sexuality” in a 
general sense, but specifically on the historical universality of sexual identity.  Past 
social psychological studies of essentialist beliefs and sexual prejudice have not asked 
examined beliefs about components of sexuality separately, as we did here.   
Method 
Participants.  Thirty five men and 34 women, who all identified as 
heterosexual, took part as volunteers (age = 18-64 years, the mean age was 25.80 (S.D. 
10.49).  
Materials  
The questionnaires consisted of two parts.  The historical essentialism measure 
was developed for this study, and consisted of  16 items, made up of four sets of four 
items, each about four components of sexuality; romantic love, sexual identity, sexual 
behaviour and sexual desire. For each component of sexuality, the first three items were 
presented as 6-point Likert items, and the fourth was an open-ended measure.  Two 
versions of the measure were constructed that referred to homosexuality and 
heterosexuality respectively (see Appendix).  Second, the questionnaire presented the 
modern homonegativity scale (Morrison &Morrison, 2002), a 12-item measure of 
modern prejudice towards lesbians and gay men.  All prejudice items were presented as 
5-point Likert items.    Demographic items were presented last.    
Procedure. Participants were recruited using the same methods as Study 1 and 
were randomly assigned to condition.   
Results 
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We first calculated historical universality scores. Individual 6-point Likert 
items were reverse coded where necessary such that high scores on all items indicated 
greater belief in historical universality.  We standardized answers to the items in 
which the date of the emergence of sexuality was guessed. Based on participants’ 
responses, we constructed a 15-point scale representing different historical periods, 
from those furthest back in time to the most recent.  The first point on this scale 
represented qualitative responses indicating absolute timelessness (e.g., ‘forever,’ 
‘always’).  Points 2-5 represented four millennial time periods; 20,000 BCE to 10,001 
BCE, 10,000 BCE to 5,001 BCE, 5,000 BCE-1 BCE, and 0 AD to 1,099 AD 
respectively.  Points 6-15 represented guesses that fell within century long periods 
from 1,100 AD to the present.  Scores on this 15 point scale were multiplied by 0.4 to 
render their range comparable to the other items and reverse coded.  The four items on 
each sub-scale were then averaged to form reliable measures of romantic love (α = 
0.75), sexual identity (α =0.81), sexual behaviour (α =0.83) and sexual desire (α 
=0.82).   Two participants skipped some of the questions in which they guessed the 
date of emergence of sexuality, and thirteen participants skipped all of them.   T-tests 
showed that mean scores did not differ on any of the subscales between participants 
who guessed the date of sexuality’s emergence and those who did not, all t  < 1.25, all 
p >.23.  The relevant participants’ scores were calculated as the average of the 
remaining three items.  We also reverse coded the modern prejudice relevant items 
and averaged them to yield a reliable measure of modern prejudice (α =.87).    
We tested whether essentialist beliefs about the components of homosexuality 
and heterosexuality differed first.  We conducted a MANOVA including two between 
subjects factors; target sexuality (homosexuality vs. heterosexuality) and participant 
gender (female vs. male) and participants’ beliefs in the universality of love, identity, 
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behaviour and desire.   Replicating the findings of Study 1, participants endorsed 
beliefs about the universality of heterosexuality significantly more than the 
comparable components of homosexuality, F (1, 65) = 8.80, p <.001, ηp2 = .36 (see 
Table 1 for specific effects).  There was a marginally significant interaction between 
participant gender and target sexuality only in regard to beliefs about sexual identity, 
F (1, 65) = 3.76, p =.06, ηp2 =.06.  Women and men reported similar beliefs about 
heterosexual identity (both M  = 3.45), but men endorsed the universality of 
homosexuality somewhat more than women (Ms = 2.85, 2.10 respectively). Tukey’s 
post hoc test (α = .05) revealed that this gender difference was not significant.  As this 
non-significant, effect was opposite in direction to the non-significant gender 
interaction in Study 1, we did not interpret it further.  All other main effects of gender 
and interactions were non-significant, F<1.5, all p >.23.    
Next, we examined the correlations between essentialist beliefs and prejudice 
(see Table 2).   Prejudice scores did not differ between participants who completed 
the items about homosexuality and the items about heterosexuality (Ms = 2.62, 2.48 
respectively), t < 1.  Relationships between universality beliefs and prejudice were 
unequal across target groups.  As Table 2 shows, belief in the universality of love, 
behaviour, and desire were significantly negatively correlated with prejudice, but only 
in the homosexuality condition. However, universality beliefs about sexual identity 
were not correlated with prejudice in either condition.  Furthermore, while beliefs 
about the historical universality of different components of sexuality were almost 
universally positively correlated with each other, beliefs about the universality of 
homosexual identity were unrelated to the beliefs about the universality of 
homosexual love or homosexual desire.  In other words, beliefs about the trans-
historical universality of homosexual identity were distinct from beliefs about other 
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components of homosexuality and no clear relationship to sexual prejudice.  Among 
heterosexual people, the belief in the historical invariance of homosexual identity 
does not seem to be essential to a non-prejudiced attitude to lesbians and gay men.  
Discussion 
 As in Study 1, participants in Study 2 endorsed beliefs about the universality 
of heterosexuality more than beliefs about the universality of homosexuality.  
However, sexual prejudice was related to beliefs about the history of homosexual love, 
desire, and behaviour, but not to beliefs about homosexual identity. Both academic 
essentialist-constructivist debates turned and recent interpretations of sodomy law in 
the United States have turned on questions about the historical universality of sexual 
identity and not about the historical universality of sexuality.  The finding that belief 
in the universality of homosexual identity is unrelated to prejudice may explain both 
why the more tolerant heterosexuals studied by Haslam and Levy (2006) and the more 
group-identified LGB people studied by Morton and Postmes (2009),are historical 
essentialists, and why many academics and  Supreme Court judges can construct 
principled opposition to heterosexist ideology that assumes that sexual identities are 
not historically universal.   
 
General Discussion 
 
Beliefs about the universality of homosexuality and heterosexuality are not 
always mirror images of each other.  Rather, people of diverse sexualities believe that 
heterosexuality is a more universal human experience than homosexuality (Study 1), 
and sexual majority people believe that homosexual love, identity behaviour and 
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desire have emerged in history more recently than their heterosexual counterparts 
(Study 2).   
Our research provides a fresh perspective on the relationship between sexual 
prejudice and essentialist beliefs about universality.  Only beliefs about 
homosexuality, and not beliefs about heterosexuality, were correlated with other 
forms of essentialist thinking (Study 1) and with sexual prejudice (Study 2).  Past 
studies of universality beliefs about sexuality suggest that historical essentialism is a 
pro-lesbian/gay strategy (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Morton & Postmes, 2009).  By 
teasing apart beliefs about different components of sexuality in Study 2, the present 
research suggests that essentialist beliefs about sexual identity may not be as essential 
to resistance against heterosexism as some theories, such as attribution theory, suggest 
(e.g., Weiner, 1995; Whitley, 1990).    
Indeed, one of the curious features of ideologies that “other” is that they both 
deny the existence of the marked group and mark lower-status group features as 
different in the course of de-legitimating them.  Consequently, members of sexual 
minority groups are disadvantaged both when their identities are not acknowledged, 
and when those identities are singled out as a cause for concern (see Herek, 2007; 
Meyer, 2003).  Because heterosexist ideology contains such contradictions, it is not 
surprising that the relationship between implicit theories of history and sexual 
prejudice is far from simple.  Past studies (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Morton & Postmes, 
2009) may have suggested that historical essentialism is the more pro-gay orientation 
to history than social constructionism. However, by teasing apart beliefs about 
different components of different sexualities, the present research suggests that such a 
conclusion would be premature.  Like the justices who ruled in the 2004 Lawrence vs. 
Texas case (see Tribe, 2004), and pro-gay/lesbian social constructionist histories (e.g., 
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Faderman, 1991; Halperin, 2000), Study 2 shows how the belief that homosexual 
identity is a modern construction is not, in essence, a heterosexist belief.   
Finally, the evidence of complex relationships between essentialist beliefs and 
sexual prejudice ought to urge caution about using essentialist beliefs as a means of 
ameliorating sexual prejudice among heterosexuals, as theorists of the first wave of 
theorizing tended to do (Whitley, 1990). This interpretation overlooks pro-gay reasons 
to reject essentialist theories.  Indeed, sexual prejudice is, in some places, becoming 
modern; and heterosexual people actively construct grounds to treat gay/lesbian 
people unfairly whilst appearing to treat them equally (Moreno & Bodenhausen, 2001; 
Morrison & Morrison, 2002; Hebl, Foster, Mannix, & Dovidio, 2002: Hegarty, Pratto, 
& Lemieux, 2004 for evidence of modern sexual prejudice). Overlooking the 
complexity of reasons that people endorse or reject the biological theory could lead 
social psychologists to unintentionally collude with such modern prejudice by 
essentializing essentialist beliefs as either more or less pro-gay than they inherently 
are.  
Like any empirical study, ours is open to criticisms about its scope.  
Replication with broader samples and with different measures of prejudice would 
assess whether we have found a universal trend in beliefs about universality beliefs or 
only an “existence proof” that applies to relatively liberal and well-educated college 
students. The studies are less open to the criticism that our conclusions could be 
reinterpreted on the grounds that heterosexuality really is a more universal experience 
than homosexuality, because heterosexual behaviour leads to reproduction, while 
homosexual behaviour does not.  As we have shown here, people can call to mind 
different components of heterosexuality that vary in their relationship to reproduction 
and report different beliefs about each of them.  Rather than assume conflate beliefs 
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about identity with beliefs about sexuality, or beliefs about sexuality with beliefs 
about homosexuliaty, we hope this study prompts more nuanced examinations of the 
relationship between essentialist beliefs and sexual prejudice.  
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Table1:  Mean Belief about the Universality of Components of Homosexuality and 
Heterosexuality (Standard Deviations in Parentheses): Study 2.   
            
Sexuality Heterosexuality     Homosexuality F(1, 65) p  ηp2 
   (n = 30)    (n = 39) 
Component 
     Love 4.08 (0.98)  3.55 (0.96)  5.67  .02 .08 
     Identity 3.71 (1.05)  2.33 (0.86)  36.64  <.001 .36 
     Behaviour 4.25 (1.01)  3.31 (1.24)  10.58  .002 .14 
     Desire 4.42 (0.82)  3.91 (1.07)  4.63  .04 .07 
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Table 2: Relationships between Beliefs about the Universality of Components of 
Homosexuality and Heterosexuality and Sexual Prejudice: Study 2.  
            
 Love  Identity  Behaviour  Desire  Prejudice 
Love  .66*** .67*** .67*** -.17 
Identity .05  .61*** .48** .05 
Behaviour .64*** .38*  .55** -.09 
Desire .76*** .18 .69***  -.22 
Prejudice -.52*** -.04 -.36* -.51**     
Note:  Correlations below the diagonal refer to beliefs about homosexuality (n = 46) 
and those above the diagonal refer to beliefs about heterosexuality (n = 39). 
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Appendix 
Essentialist Belief Items (Study 1) 
Discreteness 
1. Sexual orientations are categories with clear and sharp boundaries: [Women/Men] are 
either [heterosexual/homosexual] or they are not. 
2. [Heterosexual/homosexual] [women/men] have a necessary or defining characteristic, 
without which they would not be [heterosexual/homosexual]. 
3. [Heterosexual/homosexual] [women/men] and [homosexual/heterosexual] [women/men] 
are not fundamentally different. 
4. Bisexual [women/men] are fooling themselves and should make up their minds. 
5. Knowing a [woman/man] is [heterosexual/homosexual] tells you a lot about them. 
Immutability 
6.  Sexual orientation is caused by biological factors. 
7. Whether or not a [woman/man] is [heterosexual/homosexual] is pretty much set in early 
childhood. 
8. [Women/men] cannot change their sexual orientation. 
9. [Female/male] [heterosexuality/homosexuality] is an innate, genetically based tendency. 
10. Doctors and Psychologists can help [women/men] change their sexual orientation 
Universality 
11.  [Female/male] [heterosexuals/homosexuals] probably only exist in certain cultures. 
12. [Female/male] [heterosexuals/homosexuals] have probably existed throughout human 
history. 
13. In all cultures there are [women/men] who consider themselves 
[heterosexual/homosexual]. 
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14. The proportion of the [female/male] population that is [heterosexual/homosexual] is 
roughly the same all over the world. 
15. It is only in the last century that [female/male] [heterosexuals/homosexuals] have 
appeared in large numbers. 
 
Belief in Trans-Historical Universality Items (Study 2). 
 
Romantic Love 
It is only in the last century people experiencing [homosexual/heterosexual] romantic love 
have appeared in large numbers. 
People who experience [same-sex/opposite-sex] romantic love have always existed. 
[Homosexual/Heterosexual] romantic love is a modern phenomenon. 
If you had to guess at date at which [homosexual/heterosexual] romantic love emerged 
when would you guess?       
Identity 
It is only in the last century that people have self-identified as [homosexual/heterosexual] in 
large numbers.  
People who self-identify as [homosexual/heterosexual] have always existed. 
People identifying as [homosexual/heterosexual] is a modern phenomenon.  
If you had to guess at date at which a [homosexual/heterosexual] identity emerged when 
would you guess?      
Sexual Behaviour 
It is only in the last century that [same-sex/opposite-sex] sexual behaviours have appeared 
in large numbers.  
Sexual behaviours between those of the [same-sex/opposite-sex] have always existed. 
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[Homosexual/Heterosexual] sexual behaviours are a modern phenomena. 
If you had to guess at date at which [homosexual/heterosexual] sexual behaviours emerged 
when would you guess?        
Desire 
It is only in the last century that [homosexual/heterosexual] sexual desires have appeared in 
large numbers.  
[Same-sex/Opposite-sex] sexual desires have always existed. 
[Same-sex/Opposite-sex] sexual desires are a modern phenomena. 
If you had to guess at date at which [homosexual/heterosexual] sexual desires emerged 
when would you guess?       
